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LENDER LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS 
WASTE: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The explosion of l it igation and public concern over hazardous 
waste and other forms of pollution brings into sharp focus the conflict 
between environm ental policy goals and economic goals. 1 On the en­
vironmental side, statutes such as the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or 
"Superfund "), 2 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
("RCRA"),3 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
("FWPCA")4 represent an attempt to force cleanup of existing pollu­
tion and deter future polluting activities. On the economic side, the 
concern is to preserve economic health by promoting business activity 
in the private sector. 5 One of the most recent and significant areas in 
which these two policy goals have clashed involves the imposition of 
CERCLA liabil ity6 u pon a lending institution that becomes involved 
in the borrower's polluting activity. 7 
I. See, e.g., w. TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA JN THE AGE Of ENVIRON­
MENTALISM (1982) (asserting that environmentalism protects the vested interests of an "aristocratic 
elite" and is hostile to economic change). But see Stewart, Economics, Environment and the Limits of 
Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. I (1985). 
2. CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
3. RCRA §§ 1002-9010, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). 
4. FWPCA §§ 101-517, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 ).  
S. See W. TUCKER, supra note l .  
6. Although this Comment focuses o n  CERCLA, similar issues may arise under RCRA § 7003, 
42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (imposing liability for release on an owner/operator of a 
disposal facility) or the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 132(f)(l)-(3) (1986)  (imposing liability on owners 
or operators of discharging facilities for the unauthorized discharge of pollutants). Similarly, state 
Supcrfund statutes may raise the problem of lender liability. All but ten states have enacted legislation 
that parallels CERCLA . See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW§§ 2 7-1301 to -1321 (McKinney1984 
& Supp. 1988); Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act; 
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control 
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58: 10-23.11 to -23.34 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). Many of these same states 
have adopted "superlien" statutes which essentially allow the state to subordinate other liens in order to 
recover the costs of cleanup. See generally Kessler v. Tarrats, 194 N.J. Super. 136, 476 A.2d 3�� 
( 1984). The states without CERCLA-like legislation include Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawllli, 
Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. 
7. See generally Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes on Com­
mercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41 Bus. LAW. 1133 (1986) (suggesting methods to av01d 
environmental liability); Soriano & Locket, Hazardous Waste Liability: The Emerging Problem for 
Lenders, 12 Chemical Waste Litigation Rep. 47 (1986) (arguing that lenders may foreclose and av01d 
liability where there is a prompt reassignment); Berz & SelltOn, Lending Into Hazardous Substance 
659 
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The purpose of this Comment is four-fold. First, the CERCLA 
liability scheme will be discussed to provide the necessary statutory 
background to evaluate the efficiency of imposing liability on lenders. 
Second, the decisions of United States v. Mirabile, 8 United States v. 
Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,9 and other cases concerning lender liabil· 
ity will be discussed and analyzed. Third, an effort will be made to 
isolate the standard for imposing lender liability. Finally, the imposi­
tion of lender liability will be critiqued from an economic perspective. 
This economic analysis suggests that courts should impose liabil­
ity on lenders only where the lender is sharing in the profits of the 
manufacturer and there is a clear .. joint venture" between the lending 
institution and the polluting enterprise. The current CERCLA 
scheme imposes liability on the polluting company with the result that 
these firms will "internalize" the "external" costs of pollution. In 
other words, once the legal rule forces internalization, the individual 
firm's cost structure will reflect the true cost to society and the efficient 
level of production will be reached through the normal competitive 
process. However, imposing liability on a party who does not make 
production decisions, such as the lender, imposes costs without creat­
ing any offsetting benefit. Indeed, this imposition forces an inefficient 
result. The joint venture standard avoids this inefficiency by restrict­
ing the imposition of liability to those cases where the lender is in a 
position to exercise the production decisions. 
II. THE CERCLA LIABILITY SCHEME 
The CERCLA legislation, as amended, was enacted in response 
to the threat posed by an increasing number of hazardous waste 
dumps. 10 In order to deter future pollution and foster cleanup of ex­
isting sites, CERCLA imposes broad liability for releases of any haz­
ardous substance. 11 When an "imminent and substantial 
Liability: The Secured Creditor as "Owner" Under Superfund, 12 Chemical Waste Litigation Rep. 3S 
( 1986) (arguing that lender may be liable for foreclosure alone); Comment, Fear of Foreclosure: United 
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10165 (1986) (comparing and 
reconciling the major cases); Angelo & Bergeson, The Expanding Scope of Liability for Environmental 
Damage and Its Impact on Business Transactions, 8 CORP. L. REV. IOI (1985) (generaJ discussion of 
how CERCLA liability may affect business transactions); Burrat, Foreclosure and United States v. 
Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Paying the Piper or Learning How to Dance to a New Tune?, 11 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10098 (1987) (arguing that the court clouds the issue by discussing "public 
policy."). 
8. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
9. 16 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20557, 911 (D. Md. 1986). 
10. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995. 
11. Unite
'
d �tates v. �ortheastern Phannaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 (W.D. 
Mo. 1984), ajf 'd m part, rev 'din part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987). 
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endangerment"12 to public health exists, the government has two op­
tions. It may conduct the cleanup itself and seek reimbursement from 
"responsible parties,"13 or seek to have the responsible parties under­
take the remedial action. 14 Potentially responsible parties may be lia­
ble for all costs of removal o r  remedial action, any other necessary 
costs of response, and damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of 
natural resources, including the costs of assessing the injury, destruc­
tion or loss resulting from the release. 15 
CERCLA imposes liability on three classes of actors: past16 and 
present17 owners and/or operators of the facility, transporters of haz­
ardous substances, 18 and generators of hazardous substances.19 
Courts generally interpret CERCLA to impose strict liability.20 In ad­
dition, courts typically impose joint and several liability.21 However, 
liability will be divided if there is a reasonable basis for apportionment 
of damages. 22 
Under CERCLA, parties responsible to the government for the 
costs of cleanup cannot, by i ndemnification, "hold harmless," or simi­
lar contractual clauses, avoid liability to the government.23 Neverthe­
less, this provision does not invalidate any agreements to insure, hold 
harmless, or indemnify a contractual party for any liability.24 Fur­
thermore, CERCLA does not prevent "a cause of action that an owner 
or operator or any other person subject to liability under this section, 
or a guarantor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation or other-· 
wise against any person."25 The end result of this confusing analysis i s  
12. CERCLA § § 104(a)(l), 106(a), 4 2  U.S.C. § § 9604(a)( l), 9606(a) (1982). 
13. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9f/J7 (1982) allows the government to bring suit against "poten­
tially responsible parties." The term is not formally used or defined in CERCLA, but is used frequently 
to denote parties who could be held liable. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-4 (1988) (introductory paragraph). 
14. CERCLA § J06(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). 
15. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9f/J7(a) (1982). 
16. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982). 
17. CERCLA § 107(a)( l), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (1982). 
18. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982). 
19. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982). 
20. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d.1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Northeastern Phannaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ajf'd in part. 
m'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Price, 
577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D. N.J. 1983). 
21. See United States v. Nort heastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844-45 
(W.D. Mo. 1984) aff 'din part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 
(1987); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753, 
1759-60 (D. s.c. 1984). 
22. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. 
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
23. CERCLA § 107(eXl), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)( l) (1982). 
24. Id. 
25. CERCLA § 107(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1982). See Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, 
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that a party can not avoid liability to the government, but parties are 
free to allocate responsibility among themselves. 
This Comment will focus on the definition of "owners and opera­
tors. "26 If a lender is to be liable under CERCLA, the court must find 
that the lender is an "owner and operator." The statute defines this 
potentially responsible party to i nclude any person owning or operat­
ing a vessel o r  an offshore facility,27 or any person who owned or oper­
ated or otherwise controlled an abandoned facility immediately prior 
to its abandonment. 28 Although the statute requires a party to be an 
"owner and operator" to be liable, courts interpret the language as 
imposing liability on owners or operators. 29 
Since the purpose of CERCLA is to provide a prompt and effec­
tive response to releases and potential releases of hazardous sub­
stances, 30 the definition of "owners and operators" is interpreted very 
broadly. As a result, any party who holds an interest in a hazardous 
waste facility is  at risk of CERCLA liability. 31 Furthermore, the defi­
nition applies to "owners" and "operators" whose actions have not 
contributed to the environmental problems. Thus, courts have im­
posed liability on present owners, 32 a firm that held title for only one 
hour in order to transfer the property,33 an owner/lessor of a site,34 
corporate officers, 35 and bankruptcy trustees, 36 even though their ac­
tions played no role in the creation of the hazardous condition. 
Given the expansion of liability, it is  not surprising that courts 
have found the Superfund legislation to be applicable to lenders who 
become actively involved in the polluter/borrower's activities,37 or 
lenders who acquire title through foreclosure. 38 A lender generally is 
Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 3 1  (E.D. Mo. 1985); Colorado v .  ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 
1985). 
26. CERCLA § 107, 42 U .S.C. § 9607 (1982). 
27. CERCLA § 107(aXI), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I) (1982). 
28. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982). 
29. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20557 (D. 
Md. 1986). 
30. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
31. Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 3 6-37. 
32. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 7 5 9  F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Cauffman, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2167 (C.D. Cal. 1984). , 
33. United States v. Carolawn Co. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20698 (D. S.C. 1984) . 
. 
34. United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20616 (D. N.M. 1984); 
Umted States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753, 1755, 
1758 (D. s.c. 1984). 
35. United States v. Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20699 (D. S.C. 1984). 
36. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 4 6 9  U.S. 274 (1985). 
37. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
38. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20557 (D. Md. 
1986). 
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not liable as an "owner" or "operator" under CERCLA. The statute 
expressly exempts "a person, who, without participating in the man­
agement of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of the ownership primarily 
to protect his security i nterest in the vessel or facility."39 The policy 
rationale behind this "security interest exemption" is to encourage 
credit by not saddling lenders with environmental liabilities.40 Fur­
thermore, courts limit the exemption to lenders who did not partici­
pate in the management of the facility.4 1 Consequently, a lender may 
be exposed to massive CERCLA liability for minimal involvement in 
management activities. From the bank's perspective, the critical in­
quiry is to determine when its participation becomes sufficient to make 
an "owner" or "operator" under Superfund.42 This inquiry is only 
partly answered by the case law interpreting CERCLA. 
III. THE CASE LAW 
A. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc. 
The first case to discuss the potential environmental liability of a 
lender was Jn re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc. 43 Long involved a dispute 
over funds held by a bankruptcy trustee. Following the filing of bank­
ruptcy and the appointment of a trustee, an act of vandalism resulted 
in the release of a hazardous substance. When the trustee refused to 
take the necessary remedial action, the Environmental Protection 
Agency ("EPA") did so itself and filed an application for reimburse­
ment by the estate for the costs incurred in the cleanup. The EPA also 
sought reimbursement under the Bankruptcy Code from bankruptcy 
estate funds in which the BancOhio National Bank ("BancOhio") held 
a perfected security interest.44 
The bankruptcy court in Long held the estate liable for cleanup 
39. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982). It should be noted that the sec u rity 
interest exemption is still part of the definition. One of the unofficial reporting services inadvertently 
omitted the language from its 1986 supplement. It should also be noted that the 1986 reauthorization 
provides for an exemption for one who takes the property without knowledge of the toxic wute and 
who has made the requisite "reasonable inquiry". However, since a prerequis ite for the exemption is 
the absence of a duty to investigate, lenders will not be relieved of liability under this provision. Fur­
thermore, the conference report specifically indicates that those engaged in a commercial tra nsact ion 
will be held to a higher standard. Thus, the protection provided to a lender under this section is 
speculative, at best. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess. 4-S, 187 (1986). 
40. Berz Sexton, supra note 7, at 37. 
41. See infra notes 43-93 and acco mpanying text . 
42. Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 38 . 
43. 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 198S). 
44. Id. at 280, 287 (under 11 U.S.C. § S06(c) (1982)). The EPA also sought recovery from the 
estate under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)( l)(A) (Supp. IV 1986), arguing that the cleanup costs were an admin· 
istrative cost expended to preserve the estate and hence should receive top priority. Long, 45 Bankr. at 
280, 282. 
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costs as an administrative expense, even though the trustee had at­
tempted to abandon the property.45 The court then found that 
BancOhio was not responsible under CERCLA for the costs incurred 
by the EPA. The court utilized the security interest exemption46 to 
find that "even if BancOhio had repossessed its collateral pursuant to 
its security agreement, it would not be an 'owner or operator' under 
CERCLA."47 The court relied on the fact that BancOhio had not par­
ticipated in the management of the property.48 
B. United States v. Mirabile 
The Pennsylvania Federal District Court encountered the issue 
more squarely in United States v. Mirabile.49 In Mirabile, the United 
States sued the owners of a paint factory site to recover costs incurred 
in the cleanup of hazardous wastes on the site. The owners, the 
Mirabiles, in tum joined American Bank and Trust Company 
("ABT") and Mellon Bank (East) National Association ("Mellon") as 
third party defendants. Both ABT and Mellon were involved in fi­
nancing the operations of the paint company, which had owned the 
site at the time the hazardous condition was created. The Mirabiles 
contended that certain activities taken by the banks with respect to the 
paint site were sufficient to make the banks "owners" under CER­
CLA. ABT and Mellon counter-claimed against the Small Business 
Administration ("SBA") under a similar theory. The banks and the 
SBA moved for summary judgment, arguing that their activities 
should not subject them to CERCLA liability. 
The court granted the motion of ABT and the SBA, but refused 
to grant summary judgment to Mellon. The opinion focused on 
whether the creditors had become so "overly entangled" in the affairs 
of the paint manufacturer as to become an owner. The court sought 
guidance from related case law holding that an individual who owns 
stock in a corporation and actively participates in its management can 
be held liable for cleanup costs incurred as a result of improper dispo­
sal by the corporation. 50 The court found these cases to be of limited 
45. Leng, 45 Bankr. at 282-87. 
46. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20XA) (1982). 
47. Long, 45 Bankr. at 288-89. 
48. The court also denied the EPA's request for an equitable lien. The court stressed that 
BancOhio had already suffered a loss on its loan due to the bankruptcy status of the borrower. While it 
assumed the risk of that loss when it extended the loan, the court found that "[i]t would be inequitable, 
however, to make BancOhio bear the risk of all damage caused by property in which it holds a security 
interest." Id. at 289. 
49. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
50. Specifically, the court looked to New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, IOS2·S3 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (imposing liability on corporate officer and stockholder) United States v. Carolawn, 14 Envtl. 
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value, however, because the individual defendants' involvement was so 
extreme that it was of no help in "defining the point at which partici­
pation is too attenuated to permit the imposition of liability."51 The 
court also noted that while there was clear congressional intent to im­
pose the costs of cleanup on those responsible for the hazardous condi­
tion and those who bore the fruits of the disposal, 52 secured creditors 
should not be considered a member of that class. 53 In addition, the 
opinion referred to the security interest exemption to find legislative 
support for the policy argument. 54 
Ultimately, the court found, with respect to ABT and the SBA, 
that, "[m]ere financial ability to control waste disposal practices of the 
sort possessed by the secured creditors in this case is not ... sufficient 
for the imposition of liability."55 Specifically, the participation must 
be in the management of the hazardous waste "facility," i.e., participa­
tion in the "operational, production, or waste disposal activities."56 
ABT took the property at a sheriff's sale following the paint manufac­
turer's Chapter 11 bankruptcy and immediately assigned the bid to the 
Mirabiles. In the interim, ABT took such actions as securing the 
building against vandalism, making inquiries concerning the costs of 
hazardous waste removal, and visiting the property in order to show it 
to prospective purchasers. The court found that ABT's actions "were 
plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security interests in the 
property."57 Since ABT lacked the requisite level of participation, it 
was exempted from liability by the CERCLA security interest 
exemption. 
The motion for summary judgment had even more merit with 
respect to the SBA. Although the SBA's loan agreement with the 
paint manufacturer contemplated involvement in the management of 
the facility, this involvement never occurred. 58 In addition, mere fi­
nancial restrictions, such as those on the use of loan proceeds, were 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20699, 20700 (imposing liability on corporate officer); and United States v. 
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding trans­
porter of wastes, chemical company, and president and vice-president of chemical company jointly and 
severally liable). See Mirabile, 1 S Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995. 
Sl. Mirabile, IS Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995. 
52. Id. (citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985)). 
53. Id. Although the court did not explain why the argument cannot be applied with equal force 
to a secured creditor, presumabl y  it is because the secured creditor docs not put itself in the same 
position of risk as docs one directly involved in the management  of the facility. Stt infra notes 114 -
126 and accompanying text. 
54. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 20996. 
58. Id. at 20997. It is unclear whether actual involvement is required before l
iability will be 
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held insuffic ient to make the SBA an owner despite the Mirabiles' ar­
gument that these restrictions may have prev�nted the redirection ?f 
funds into cleanup activities. Since the SBA's involvement was only m 
the financial  aspects of the company, and not in the management of 
the facility, it was entitled to summary judgment absolving it from 
liability. 59 
In contrast to ABT and the SBA, Mellon's lending activities were 
closely enough entangled with the polluter to present a jury question 
regarding Mellon's status as an "owner" or "operator." Of particular 
concern to the court was the constant presence of one Mellon loan 
officer at the paint company. The officer testified that he became more 
involved with the paint company because "his superiors at Mellon 
wanted him t o  have 'more of a day-to-day hands-on involvement.' "60 
More specifically, the officer was to m onitor the cash collateral ac­
counts, establish a reporting system between the company and Mellon, 
and determine the order in which paint orders would be filled. The 
officer also insisted on additional sales efforts and certain manufactur­
ing changes. While noting that "[t]he reed upon which the Mirabiles 
seek to impose liability on Mellon is slender indeed,"61 the court found 
that the testimony presented a genuine issue of fact and, thus, denied 
Mellon's request for summary judgment. 
C. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland at­
tempted to clarify the standard in United States v. Maryland Bank & 
Trust. 62 In Maryland Bank, the original owners, the McLeods, oper­
ated a trash and garbage business o n  the site that was eventually la­
beled the California Maryland Drum site or "CMD site." The son of 
the original o wners purchased the property with a loan from Mary­
land Bank & Trust (MBT), but soon defaulted on the loan payments. 
�BT foreclosed and took title at a foreclosure sale. Following the 
discovery of the hazardous waste a t  the site, the EPA requested that 
MBT, as an owner, initiate cleanup activities. The bank refused, so 
the agency cleaned up the site itself and filed the action seeking re· 
sponse costs from MBT. 
MBT argued that the security interest exemption applied.63 The 
imposed. It seems probable th t t I . 
I 
a con ractua clauses will be viewed cumulatively in order to find the 
ender to be an owner s · , r. . 
. . 
· ee mJra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
59. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20997. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. ����ti. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20557 (D. Md. 1986). 63. LA § IOl(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982). 
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court responded by stating that when MBT purchased the property at 
the foreclosure sale, i ts security interest ripened into an investment. 
Thus, MBT "purchased the property at the foreclosure sale not to pro­
tect its security interest, but to protect its investment."64 The court 
distinguished Mirabile based upon the length of time that the secured 
party held the property following foreclosure. 6s The court limited the 
application of its decision by holding that, "[t]he [security interest] 
exclusion does not apply to former mortgagees currently holding title 
after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, at least when, as 
here, the former mortgagee has held title for nearly four years, and a 
full year before the EPA cleanup.,,66 However, the court declined to 
discuss the situation where the foreclosing party promptly reassigns 
the property.67 This leaves open the possibility that the secured party 
may be held liable for merely purchasing the property at the foreclo­
sure sale because that is when the "security interest ripens into an 
investment." 
The court also cited two policy rationales for limiting the applica­
bility of the security interest exemption. First, the insulation from lia­
bility would give the lender a competitive advantage at the foreclosure 
sale. 68 Since all other prospective purchasers would be faced with po­
tential CERCLA liability, the lender could purchase the property for a 
depressed price, wait for the EPA to clean up the property at taxpayer 
expense, and sell the property at a profit. 69 
The second policy cited by the court in support of a narrow read­
ing of the security interest exemption was that lenders should, and 
often do, routinely perform precisely the type of investigation that 
would lead to discovery of hazardous waste. 70 Thus, if they are able to 
avoid CERCLA liability, the statute would, in essence, be "an insur­
ance scheme" absolving secured lenders "from responsibility for their 
mistake in judgments."71 
64. Maryland Bank, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20559. 
65. Id. at 20560. 
66. Id. at 20559. 
67. Id. at 20559 n.5. 
68. Id at 20660. 
69. One commentator isolates the flaw inherent in this rationale. "(W)hile it may be inappropri· 
at e to grant a lending institution a windfall at the government's expense, it may be equally inappropri·
 
ate to penalize an innocent lending institution by imposing a liability the amount of whi
ch greatly 
exceeds the value of the land, even in a pristine state." Soriano & Lockett. SMpra note 7• at 57·58· One 
suggested solution is to allow the lender 10 choose between forfeiting its interest m the
 collateral in 
which case its potential liability would cease, or keep the property and pay cleanup costs. 
Id. at 58 
n.26. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
70. Maryland Bank, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20S60. . 
71. Id. For the problems with this rationale, see supra notes 118-122 and accompany
ing tut. 
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IV. THE EMERGING STANDARD72 
While the standard is far from clear, it is possible to glean some 
guiding principles from the previously discussed cases. The basic prin­
ciple is that for a lender to be liable as an owner under CERCLA, its 
involvement must b e  in the management of the borrower's facility, as 
opposed to the management of the borrower's financial affairs. The 
Mirabile court indicated that "it would appear that before a secured 
creditor such as ABT may be liable, it must, at a minimum, participate 
in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site. "73 
In addition to this general standard, the cases also isolate specific 
activities that are likely to s ubject a lender to CERCLA liability. For 
example, cJauses, even if not exercised, that allow the lender to ap­
prove the borrower's managerial appointments, to approve major busi­
ness transactions of the borrower, or to provide "management 
assistance" to the borrower may lead to the conclusion that the lender 
is an owner. 74 In addition, if the lender hires a management consult­
ant to assist the borrower in  its affairs or assists in implementing man­
ufacturing or design changes or reassigning personnel, it risks 
CERCLA liability. I n  contrast, purely financial activities such as 
placing caps on dividends and salaries payable to the borrower's of­
ficers, reserving the right to approve the p urchase of life insurance for 
the borrower's emp loyees, general involvement in the accounting and 
records of the borrower, or assisting the borrower with marketing or 
sales strategy and tactics in basic activities of the company that do not 
specifically involve generation, disposal, or storage of hazardous 
wastes will not typically subject the lender to liability.75 
Despite these "guiding principles," the standard is very uncer­
tain. 76 Indeed, given the complexity of the issue and the varying de­
grees and types of participation by banks, it is very difficult to attain a 
"bright-line" standard. However, that should not deter the courts 
from attempting to forge a clear standard to aid lenders in avoiding 
those activities that will subject them to environmental liability. In 
72. The text of this section relies heavily upon the principles enunciated in Berz & Sexton, supra 
note 7, at 41-43. 
73. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20996. 
74. Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 41-42. 
75. An in depth analysis of these activities merely gives rise to more difficult issues. For example, 
drawing the line between assistance in marketing or sales strategy and assistance in the management of 
the facility may be difficult. Similarly, while mere "suggestions" of ways to make the operation should 
not subject the lender to liability, it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell when a "suggestion" becomes 
"management assistance." 
76. Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 43. 
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this regard, several issues must be resolved before a clear, usable stan­
dard becomes a reality. 
One of these open issues concerns the application of the standard 
where the borrower is engaged solely in  the disposal of hazardous 
waste. Indeed, the Mirabile court, in a footnote, indicates that "[i]t 
may be that a different test would be appropriate for financers of enti­
ties whose sole business is that of hazardous waste disposal. "77 While 
this test is not discussed in the case law, it presumably would impose 
lender liability based on lesser involvement in the management of the 
facility.78 
Although the different standard may be justified on the basis of 
the higher degree of  risk that the lender can uncover with a cursory 
examination, it is arguable that there should be no difference in  the 
standard. The disproportionality of liability to the value of the secur­
ity interest is present in this situation, just as it is when hazardous 
waste is an indirect effect of the productive activity.79 Also, limiting 
the available funds80 to those firms in the disposal industry may be 
counterproductive by decreasing competition among disposal compa­
nies. 81 The result of decreased competition will be an increase in the 
cost of disposal. 82 Consequently, to minimize cleanup costs, the se­
cu red creditor who loans money to a company directly involved in the 
waste disposal business should be treated in the same manner as a 
secured creditor who loans money to a company who pollutes as an 
effect of the manufacturing process. 
The second issue that the cases leave unanswered concerns the 
77. Mirabile, IS Envtl. L. Rep. at 20996 n.S. 
78. This will be the case because the business of the borrower is hazardous waste disposal. Consc· 
quently, by becoming involved in the financial activity of the borrower, the lender is directly involved in 
the financial aspects of hazardous waste disposal, rather than merely involved in financial activities of a 
business, where one of the effects of that business is the production of hazardous waste. 
79. See supra note 66. 
80. The argument is that imposing liability will prevent lenders from loaning money to potential 
polluters and thus increase the interest rate. See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying tut. The etrect 
will be particularly acute with respect to firms engaged in the disposal of hazardous waste because the 
risks are much more apparent. 
81. Competition may decrease because the high interest rate will act as a barrier to entry. While 
the significance of the interest rate cannot be known without statistical analysis, there are two rea.\Ons 
to believe that it will be large. First, due to the high level of risk involved, the interest rate is likely to 
increase dramatically. Second, due to the capital intensive nature of the waste disposal industry . an 
increase in the interest rate  will dramatically increase start-up costs for potential entrants. In addition, 
lending institutions might react to the higher degree of risk by limiting their lending involvement to 
those disposal firms with existing reputations and choose not to take a chance on a new entrant whom 
they perceive as more likely to make a costly mistake. For a discussion of barriers to entl')', see gener­
ally J. BAIN, PRICE THEORY )93-95 (1952); J. fflRSHLEIF£R, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 262-65 (1976). 
82. That a monopolized industry will charge a higher price than a competitive industry is well 
documented by the economic literature. E.g., J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 81. at 274-301. 
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ability of a lender to foreclose at all. 83 Mirabile 
.
hel? that a lender 
could foreclose and still be protected b y  the secunty interest exemp­
tion. Indeed, the court specifically ruled that ABT's activities follow­
ing foreclosure, taken to secure the propert� aga�nst vandalis� and 
prevent further depreciation, did not constitute �nvolve
.
ment m the 
normal day-to-day operation of the site and were msuffic1ent to make 
ABT an owner.84 
However, the Maryland Bank court cast doubt on that part of the 
Mirabile decision. It stated that the bank took title "not to protect its 
security interest, but to protect its investment. "85 The court reasoned 
that the security interest exemption applies only to "those persons 
who, at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a 
then-held security interest in the land. "86 Consequently, the security 
interest "terminated at the foreclosure sale ... at which time it ripened 
into full title. "87 A literal reading of this language suggests that the 
moment the bank takes title following foreclosure, it becomes an 
owner under CERCLA. The fact that the court expressly refused to 
decide whether a prompt reassignment of the foreclosed property 
would preserve the security interest exemption leaves the question 
open whether foreclosure itself will render the lender an owner, or 
whether the analysis is limited to actions following foreclosure. In any 
event, liability for foreclosure alone is a risk that lenders will be forced 
to consider in the loan-making process. 
• Even if the act of foreclosing on a previously-polluted site will not 
result in CERCLA liability, foreclosing on an active facility may well 
lead to liability.88 Where the security interest is in land that houses an 
active enterprise, often the best way to preserve its value is to continue 
the operation of the facility. 89 The lending institution is caught in the 
middle: It can force the company to shut down, in which case the 
value of the security interest plummets, o r  it can continue to operate 
the facility. 
The decision is equally difficult for the courts. Quite simply, 
there are no specific standards for determining the liability of a lender 
who forecloses on polluted property. The question is whether the 
lender took title to protect its security interest or as an investment. 
83. Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 43-44. 
84. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20996 ("Regardless of the nature of the title received by ABT, 
its actions with respect to the foreclosure were plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security 
interest in the property."). 
85. Maryland Bank, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20559. 
86. Id. (emphasis added). 
87. Id. 
88. Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 44. 
89. See Soriano & Lockett, supra note 7, at 59. 
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The answer would seem to hinge upon a determination of the intent of 
the foreclosing party. However, given the general expansion of liabil­
ity, 90 it seems likely that the exclusion will be construed narrowly and 
liability will be imposed in close cases. Consequently, the secured 
creditor foreclosing on an active facility faces a serious risk of CER­
CLA liability if it continues management operations. 
Finally, although both decisions speak in terms of involvement in 
the "day-to-day operations of the facility," it is possible that "even 
conditions or restrictions on the borrower's financial affairs generally, 
if there are several, may be viewed cumulatively by a court as consti­
tuting sufficient involvement in the borrower's facility to warrant the 
imposition of Superfund liability. . . . "91 Since it is axiomatic that 
financial restrictions will have an effect on the operation of the facility, 
courts may impose liability where the effect of the financial restrictions 
on the facility is great enough to constitute involvement in the 
facility.92 
As a result of these unresolved questions, the standard is very 
uncertain. However, given the tenor and approach of most of the re­
cent CERCLA cases, it seems likely that courts will expand the situa­
tions where a lender will be held liable.93 To determine whether this 
expansion of liability is a net benefit or net detriment to society, an 
economic analysis of the costs and benefits of the legal rule is appropri­
ate. This economic analysis reveals that it is both inefficient and 
counter-productive to hold lenders liable unless the evidence clearly 
establishes a "joint venture" between the lender and borrower. 
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
A. Economics as a Paradigm 
Perhaps the most appropriate paradigm to isolate the effects of a 
legal rule that holds lenders liable for the p olluting activities of a bor­
rower is economics. Although economic analysis is useful in a broad 
range of situations, 94 it seems particularly appropriate in the present 
matter because of the obvious impact on businesses. 
Economics measures the societal value of a legal rule by measur-
90. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. 
91. Berz & Sexton, supra note 7, at 43. 
92. This would essentially affirm the argument made by the EPA in In rr T.P. Long Chem., Inc .• 
45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), that by placing financial restrictions on the borrower, the 
lender has a significant effect on the actual management of the facility and should be held liable. Stt id 
at 288. 
93. See supra notes 30 - 38 and accompanying text. 
94. For a good explanation of the benefits and limitation! of economic analysis. stt R. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 22-26 (3rd ed. 1986). For a view that economicl may not be appropn-
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ing its relative efficiency.95 The concept of efficiency, as utilized in this 
Comment, means providing goods, services and intangible items in 
amounts that maximize aggregate social welfare. 96 Since consumers 
are willing to pay a price for goods and services produced by polluting 
firms, the availability of these items obviously increases efficiency. 
However, consumers are also willing to .. pay a price" to reduce pollu­
tion. 97 The consequence is that the social cost of pollution must be 
included in the policy analysis in order to get an accurate measure of 
aggregate social welfare. 
The tool that economics uses to find this efficient level of produc­
tion is marginalist analysis.98 "Analyzing at the margin" requires ex­
amining the cost and benefit of each additional unit of production.99 If 
the "marginal benefit" of a given unit is greater than the "marginal 
cost," production of that unit will result in a net increase in social 
welfare. Consequently, the unit should be produced. Conversely, if 
the marginal benefit is less than the marginal cost, production of the 
given unit results in a net decrease in social welfare. Thus, the unit 
should not be produced. Similar analysis of each unit leads to the 
result that the efficient output is reached where the marginal benefit 
just equals the marginal cost. 
Marginalist analysis indicates that the efficient level of production 
will be reached as a profit motivated firm makes decisions to maximize 
profit. The assumption is that the individual firm will calculate and 
consider all relevant costs. However, pollution imposes serious costs 
on society that are not considered by the firm. 100 In other words, the 
production of the goods and services in question produces external 
ate to the study of law, see Leif, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominolism, 60 VA. 
L. R EV. 45 1 ( 1974), and J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 255-75 ( 1984). 
95. R. POSNER, supra note 94, at 1 3·14. 
96. See id. at 12. Thus, "efficiency" is a function of both the goods and services produced by the 
polluting manufacturer and the amount of hazardous waste it generates. See also A. FELDMAN, WEL· 
FARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 3 (1 980) (defining efficiency as a "pareto optimum" 
- a situation where there is no alternative available that would make some people better off and no one 
worse off). For a list and explanation of some of the most popular notions of efficiency, see Coleman, 
Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 5 1 2-20 (1980). 
97. Harrison & Rubinfeld, Bedonie Housing Prices and the Demand for Cleon Air, 5 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 63 (1978). 
98. For a good exposition of marginalist analysis, see R. RUFFIN & P. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS 5 ( 1 983). 
99. For a recent exposition rejecting cost-benefit analysis in this context see Sheehan, Econom· 
ism, Democracy and Hazardous Wastes: Some Policy Considerations in CONTR�VERSIES IN ENVIRON­
M ENTAL POLICY I08 (S. Kamienicki, R. O'Brien & M. Clarke eds. 1 986). 
lOO. Certainly some firms will "consider" the societal costs of pollution but the assumption that 
firms are motivated solely by p fit · bl · . ' · ·11 It r ro ts reasona e and a few vanants from this assumption w1 not a e 
the analysis. See R. POSNER, supra note 94, at 1 5 - 1 7. 
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costs that are not a part of the firm's decision-making process. In eco­
nomic terms, pollution is the classic example of an "externality." 101 
The appropriate solution to an extemality problem is to force the 
firms to include the external cost in their internal production deci­
sions. 102 This process, often called "internalization," may be accom­
plished by a legal rule. Indeed, the CERCLA policy of imposing 
liability upon those who benefit from the activity is arguably a form of 
internalization. 103 By requiring the polluting company to pay re­
sponse and cleanup costs, the business is forced to pay for the external 
cost of pollution. 
The result of the internalization process is a reduction in produc­
tive output. 104 The legal rule imposing liability on polluting businesses 
101.  E.g., E. BROWNING & ]. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 32 (1 979); 
A. FELDMAN, supra note 96, at 91 .  
102. G .  CALABRESI, THE Cos TS  O F  ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS 21 2 (4th 
ed. 1975). Posner takes the view that "internalization" is not always the most efficient solution. Essen­
tially, the application of his argument to environmental liability is that it may be cheaper to have the 
lender or consumers bear the costs of cleanup. It will be argued subsequently that the polluter itself is 
the least-cost avoider of pollution. Consequently, the polluter should bear the burden. Stt R. POSNER, 
supra note 94, at 54. 
103. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical .t Chem. Co., S79 F. Supp. 823, 838 
(W.D. Mo. 1984), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 
(1 987). 




Assume a polluting business with some market power. Consequently, the flnn demand curve (0) 
slopes downward with the marginal revenue curve (MR) placed somewhere to 1he left. Costs. absent 
internalization, are represented by ATC and MC, with ATC standing for the averaae total cost curve, 
and MC standing for the marginal cost curve. As we are taught in any intermediate economics class, 
the efficient level of production is found where MR "'" MC, or at output Q. 
A law forcing internal ization of external costs, such as CERCLA. has the eft'ect of increasing the 
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increases the cost of operation. As costs increase, the gap between 
marginal benefit and marginal cost decreases and the efficient level of 
output gets smaller. If a certain activity is producing unaccounted-for 
external costs, society demands that the activity be reduced. Conse­
quently, the internalization of external costs is merely a method of 
using the firm's profit-making decisions to reach the efficient result. 
As output is reduced, the result will likely include some firms going 
out of business. As internalization increases the cost of doing busi­
ness, many firms will find it unprofitable to continue operating. If the 
expected liability increases expected costs enough, the firm would be 
better off to cease operations and go out of business. 105 
This conclusion rests upon an assumption that the market is bet­
ter able to "find" the efficient level than is government regulation. If 
information were perfect and costless, the government could imple­
ment and enforce regulations without costs, and the outcomes would 
be precisely the same. 106 However, neither of these propositions is 
true. Information is often unattainable. Consumers' wants and 
desires are often based upon unarticulable or even unknown factors. 
The additional "costs" of government errors are well documented. 107 
Thus, the best that the government can hope to do is to approximate 
the societal costs associated with hazardous waste 108 and force the in· 
ternalization of those costs through a legal rule. 
While the above analysis reveals that the polluting firms should 
be held liable to force internalization of the external costs of pollution, 
costs of production to the firm. Graphically, this has the elfect of increasing average total costs from 
ATC to ATC, and shifting marginal costs from MC to MC,. The efficient level is where MR = MC,, 
or output Q,.  The resulting output is lower than in the absence of internalization, at a higher price. 
This graph may be found in any price-theory text book. E.g. , J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 8 1 ,  at 
274-78. The result may also be reached using mathematics. See J.  HENDERSON & R. QUANDT. 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 42-55 ( 1 958). For a simpler exposition. 
see A. FELDMAN, supra note 96, at 89- 105. 
105. These industries have some social value or they would be driven out of business. See F.M. 
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 1 3- 1 4  (2d ed. 1 980). While the costs 
of cleanup probably will force many of these firms out of business, some may bear the cost and remain 
viable. Thus, a complete elimination of productive output is inefficient. 
106. If information were perfect, the government would set production at Q, the efficient level. 
However, it seems indisputable that information is not perfect. It is for this reason that we say a 
voluntary exchange or market is more efficient than heavy regulation . R. POSNER, supra note 94, at 14.  
Indeed, much of the current debate in the environmental literature revolves around the use of a price 
mechanism in pollution control. See, e.g. , Schelling, Preface to INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION ix-xix (T. Schelling ed. 1 983). 
I 07 · See Drucker, The Sickness of Government, Pue. INTEREST 3, 13 (Winter 1969) . 
. 
108. The best approximation will probably be the cost of cleanup. However, this is an "approxi· 
matton" rather than a true measure because societal costs may be greater than the cost of cleanup. 
That is, consumers may wish to have the products associated with the hazardous waste production 
rather than forcing an elimination or decrease in the amount of available products. This possibility 
should be ignored since Congress has made a judgment to clean up the hazardous waste sites. 
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the analysis does not, thus far, justify imposing liability on lenders. 
Lender liability will be efficient if the benefits of additional deterrence 
and additional funds for cleanup outweigh the additional costs. These 
costs and benefits must include the effect that the rule will have on the 
future behavior of parties. 109 
It can be argued that Congress has eliminated any such prospec­
tive effect of the rule by focusing on the cleanup at existing hazardous 
waste sites. 1 10 The argument is that the Congress's concern was with 
the current cleanup and not with influencing future behavior. This 
argument is not persuasive. First, although cleanup and deterrence 
are distinct concepts, they are quite clearly related. Thus, a costly 
cleanup remedy will clearly influence the way that parties in the future 
behave. Consequently, any analysis of such a sweeping rule which ig­
nores its effects on parties' future behavior is inadequate. Second, 
Congressional intent concerning who should pay the cost of cleanup 
evinces some level o f  concern regarding the prospective effects of the 
rule. Congress has made a judgment that all hazardous waste sites, 
now and in the future, should be cleaned up. 
Furthermore, Superfund provides that those who benefit from 
polluting activity should pay the cost of cleanup. 1 1 1  Despite this gen­
eral proposition, the q uestion of who, in fact, benefits from the activity 
is left for the courts. Specifically, the question of whether a lender 
"benefits" to the level required is left unanswered by the statute. 1 1 2 In 
other words, Congress left the question of determining the allocation 
of cleanup costs to the courts. Indeed, the security interest exemption 
seems to represent a congressional judgment that the costs associated 
with lender liability are too great absent some special circum­
stances. 1 13 Consequently, to resolve the questions left open by the 
statute, and appropriately allocate the costs of cleanup, the courts 
should consider the prospective benefits and costs of a legal rule im­
posing liability on lenders. 
B. The Cost Benefit Analysis 
While economic theory reveals that forcing polluting enterprises 
to internalize external costs promotes efficiency, the question remains 
whether a rule forcing lending institutions to do the same thing leads 
109. R. POSNER, supra note 94, at 18-19. 
1 10. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1068-79 (D. Colo. 1985). 
1 1 1. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst .) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
1 12. The only relevant legislative history reveals that the security interest exemption was intended 
to apply to persons holding title merely to secure a loan. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, pt. II, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess. JS ( 1980). 
1 1 3. See Berz & Sexton, supro note 7, at 37. 
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us closer to the desired result. This Comment argues that it does not 
aid in leading us to the efficient result and, in all likelihood, will be a 
detriment. 
The benefits of imposing liability on lenders are clear. The lend­
ing institution can certainly provide a "deep pocket" from which to 
pay the cost of cleanup. 1 1 4 This imposition of liability will not only 
aid the cleanup of the particular site in question, but can also provide 
funds for future cleanups since the lender cleanup payments will help 
replenish the moneys in Superfund. 1 1 5 
The imposition o f  lender liability also has deterrence benefits. 
Lenders will be reluctant to loan money to potential polluters unless 
they can contractually limit their responsibility for pollution. As the 
availability of funds to p olluting businesses becomes more scarce, the 
output of the industry will decrease and, as a result, so will pollution. 
However, this efficient result can be reached more directly by impos­
ing liability upon the polluting industry. That is, liability on lenders 
and on polluters may be substitutes for one another. However, they 
are not necessarily complementary policies. That is, the key question 
is whether imposing liability on lenders in addition to polluting indus­
tries is more efficient than limiting liability to polluting firms. This 
Comment argues that imposing liability on lenders, in addition to lia­
bility on the industry, will impose significant costs on the industry and 
cause it to reduce output below the efficient level. These costs may be 
conveniently, though perhaps artificially, divided into three categories: 
costs to the lender, costs to the borrower, and costs to third parties. 1 16 
1 .  Costs to the Lender 
The most obvious cost imposed upon the lender is the direct cost 
of cleaning up the hazardous waste. As discussed previously, these 
costs are often disproportionate to the value of the security interest or 
even the loan itself. 1 1 7 As a result, the lender must somehow pay for 
the liability associated with the hazardous waste. Presumably, this 
payment will come out of the profits of the lending institution or from 
a contingency fund. Given the generally unstable condition of many 
1 1 4. Soriano & Lockett, supra note 7, at 58 n.29. 
1 1 5. The "fund" is now supplied by a tax on chemical companies. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1986). 
1 16. This division is artificial since costs imposed on the lender will inevitably have an impact on 
the borrower and consumer through higher interest rates. Similarly, a cost imposed on the borrower 
will affect the lender through a lower demand for capital and the consumer through less available 
products. Nevertheless, the division is useful for analytical purposes. 
1 1 7. See supra note 69. 
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banks today' 18 and the large liability costs associated with CERCLA, 
lender liability may have a significant negative impact by increasing 
the risk of bank failures. 
Another way to view this objection is in terms of insurance. 
Lenders subject to potential liability may become, in essence, insurers; 
they offer a loan to a firm at a slightly higher than competitive rate in 
exchange for assuming liability for cleanup costs. The difference be­
tween the competitive rate and the rate offered can be considered an 
insurance premium. 
In addition to the direct costs of liability, the lender will also in­
cur many costs as it attempts to avoid liability in its role as an insurer. 
Lenders, as a class, are inefficient insurers. Although the Maryland 
Bank court asserted that "[f]inancial institutions are in a position to 
investigate and discover potential problems in their secured proper­
ties," and that "such research is routine," the court offers no support 
for this proposition. 1 19 At least one commentator disagrees with this 
assessment, arguing that the requisite specialized, technical compe­
tence is rarely held among lending institutions. 1 20 Consequently, lend­
ers must expend time and resources to acquire the necessary 
competence, as well as the direct cost associated with perfonning and 
evaluating the tests. 1 2 1  
The direct costs of testing are likely to be quite large. Estimates 
of the cost range from $2,000 to $3,000 for a "red ftag" test to $12,000 
to $20,000 when waste contamination is involved. 122 Furthermore, 
even when a hazardous waste site is identified, the costs do not end. 
Before a case actually goes to trial, both the government and the po­
tentially responsible party spend months or even years perfonning in­
dependent tests to determine the existence, scope, and cause of the 
environmental harm. 1 23 
1 1 8. 78 banks failed in 1984. Projitab/ility of Jnsurtd Comm�rcia/ Banks in 1984, 71 FED. RE· 
Sl'.RVE BULL 836, 836 (Nov. 1985). 1 18 failed in 1985. Profitability of U.S. -Cltantrtd ltUMrtd Com· 
mercia/ Banks in 1 985, 72 FED. RESERVE BULL. 618 (Sept. 1 986). Both of these numbers weft 
records. 
1 1 9. United States v. Maryland Bank &: Trust Co., 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,57, 
20560 (D. Md. 1986). 
120. Set Pfeiler, Construction Lending and Products Liability, 2' Bus. I.Aw. 1309, 1 324 ( 1 970) 
(discussing lender liability for defective residential construction). 
1 2 1 .  It could be argued that the cases discusaed earlier in this Comment have forced lenden to 
develop the necessary expertise. Given that �ult. the coats have been aunk and it may now be cf&cient 
for them to conduct the necessary testing. However, this argument is not perauaaive. First. u argued 
below, the variable costs will also tend to be quite large. Second. the mere flci that they have the 
expertise docs not justify the expenses to maintain it or additional liability. Stt T•IF· TOJtit: Was1' 
Sius hoH Bank Liability H«idacht, The Denver POii, Aug. 1 6, 1987, at 01, col. 4. 
122. Id. 
123.  Pfeiler, supra note 120, at 13 14. 
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It could be arg u ed t hat the m ere existence of hazardous waste 
s hould be enough to d et er banks from l ending money. However, if the 
t ests are merely a litmus test or a red flag for the existence of hazard­
ous waste, the lender may deny funds to many businesses that could 
r emain viable despite t he added cleanup costs. 124 The result is that 
output is decreased below t he efficient level as potentially viable busi­
n esses fail due to t h e  excessively hig h  cost of borrowed funds. 
The better view is  t hat actions taken by a financial institution to 
guarantee a valuable s ecurity interest, such as environmental testing, 
should not, in and o f  themselves, expose t he institution to potential 
liability. Even if t he l ender does routinely p erform some form of tests, 
these s hould not be viewed as the equivalent of tests taken pursuant to 
a duty owed to a third party. 125  Positive test results will reduce the 
expected profit of a loan as both the borrower's ability to pay and the 
value of the security interest in case of d efault are reduced. 126 The 
cost of funds to the borrower increases and output will be reduced. 
The result is efficient because the availability of funds will reflect the 
borrower's ability to pay, w hich, in tum, r eflects the societal cost of 
pollution. 127 In contrast, direct liability on t he lender forces a reduc­
tion in loanable funds that is  unrelated to actual market conditions, as 
d efined by the borrower's ability to pay. 
In addition to th e costs associated with testing, lender liability 
may force the financial institution into a no-win situation. Recent ex­
pansion of lender liability outside of t he environmental context seems 
to indicate that a bank may be held liable for not intervening to force 
changes in the business d ecisions of the borrower. 128 Ironically, the 
l ender may be liable for failing to take the very actions that, if affirma­
tively taken, would subj ect it to CERCLA liability. The only clear 
effect of these conflicting t heories is that the loan becomes less profita­
ble to the lender and l ess funds are available to the borrower. 
The above mentioned costs will decrease the profits of the lending 
institution, either t hrou g h  direct expense or lost business as the lend­
ers either balk at potential liability or raise their rules to protect them­
s elves against heightened exposure. Thus, the legal rule imposes the 
cost arbitrarily on parti es who benefit only p eripherally. If the lender 
l 24. If the financial institution refuses to lend every time test results show existence of hazardous 
waste, it will refuse funds to many businesses which could absorb the costs of cleanup and continue 
operation. 
125. See Pfeiler, supra note 1 20. 
126. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text. 
. 
127· This conclusion assumes that the cost of pollution is internalized due to the CERCLA liabil-
ity scheme. See supra notes 100 - 103 and accompanying text. 
1 28. E.g. State Nat'I Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); see also Swartz, Lender Liability, U.S. BANKER 10 (May 1 986). 
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is unable to pass on the costs associated with liability and potential 
liability, then the shareholders of the lender will be forced to bear 
them. 
Imposing these costs on lenders should be contrasted with impos­
ing the costs on the polluter itself. Since the polluting enterprise re­
ceives profits directly from the polluting activity, forcing them to pay 
for testing and cleanup costs is consistent with internalization. That 
is, these costs are appropriately regarded as a cost of doing business. 
In contrast, the lender benefits only indirectly. Indeed, if the policy of 
forcing those who benefit to pay the costs is extended to hold lenders 
liable, the logical result is that suppliers of materials used in the pollut­
ing production process should be held liable along with lenders since 
the lender is nothing more than a supplier of funds. 
2. Costs to the Borrower 
It is clear that some costs must be imposed on the borrower in 
order to force the firm to the efficient level of production. More specif­
ically, the firm must internalize the cost of pollution. Once the inter­
nalization is completed, the natural and efficient result is a reduction 
in available funds. 1 29 The reasons are relatively straightforward. A 
lender's decision to lend money is based on at least three variables. '30 
The probability of a loan is positively related to the borrower's ability 
to repay the loan and the value of the security interest in case of a 
default. That same probability ·is negatively related to the administra­
tive costs associated with the loan. 1 3 1  Given this framework, it is easy 
to see why efficiency results in the restriction of available funds. 
Potential CERCLA liability will affect two of the three variables. 
The borrower's ability to repay is adversely affected. The liability re­
stricts the firm's profits and internal funds, thus making the default 
more probable. Similarly, CERCLA liability reduces the value of the 
security interest. In other words, a piece of land is worth more with­
out hazardous wastes than it is when pollution is present. Thus, the 
internalization process inevitably leads to a reduction in the supply of 
funds to borrowers because of risk of lending to a polluting enterprise. 
When the lender considers the potential liability of the borrower 
1 29. Since r<Hcntial l iabi lity wil l  decrease 1he borrower's ability to pay and .
'he value or rhe secur· 
1 1 Y  in terest. !he lender will not be as willing to loan and the fonds available to the mduMry will dei:re;i�. 
I l(J M '. · · .· · b 1 th•y are ignor� for analytic;il ea�. · · any orher factors are involved in this decision. u  
1 1 1 M · . LD fi(P +  S +  A - )  where LD "" the deci�ion · · athemat1cally. this can be expressed as "" • • • 
.
.
 1 "  loan. I' 
= ability to rc:pay . S = value of the security inter('!;! in case or default and A "" admm•�lra· 
1 " · · · · 
· 
· · t relit increa!l6 mort rund� will he ' rns1 .,. Consequently. as the ab1hty 10 pay or the sec unty '" e · · · · 
•r· ·· ' · · h I d · 1 1  bc:come mort rtluctant 10 loan !.! anku 111 loans. As the admi nistrative costs increase. t e en er wi 
fund,_ 
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as it affects the return on the loan, the resulting constriction in the 
supply of funds poses no costs, except those costs which appropriately 
reflect market conditions. 1 32 In contrast,  imposing lender liability 
reduces the supply of funds beyond the efficient level and poses the 
risk of undesirable behavior. The lender still considers potential bor­
rower liability since at  the inception of a loan agreement the borrower 
may be held liable. However, in addition to borrower liability, the 
lender must also assess his own potential liability. In tenns of the 
variables isolated above, the lender's potential liability further reduces 
the value of the already depressed security interest. As a result, the 
expected value of the security interest will often be negative. 133 That 
is, the existence of a security interest may actually constitute a liability 
as the lender ponders the decision of whether or not to loan. Further­
more, as argued above, the administrative costs associated with the 
loan are likely to be high. 1 34 The economic result is that funds are 
restricted beyond the efficient level, and, consequently, the output level 
is below the efficient level 
Under these circumstances, the lender may be willing to loan 
132. This may be illustrated by a graph. 
j PL+LL 
QPL+LL QPL Q Q 
s 
The graph shows the classic supply and demand diagram for loanable funds. Given the demand 
for loanable funds, the effect of different liability rules is seen as a shift leftward in the supply of funds. S 
represents the supply of funds where there is no threat of either polluter or lender liability. SPL illus­
trates that the supply of funds decreases, or shifts left, as liability is imposed on the polluter only. As 
argued above, this is efficient since it forces the polluter to pay for the cost of cleanup and internalize 
the external costs of polluti s. · · 
I" b. . 
on. ee supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text. However, imposing 
ta ihty on the lender, as well as the polluter, further restricts the supply of funds. This is graphically 
represented by S Th I · h" h · •t + LL· e resu t ts a 1g er interest rate and a lower quantity of funds. In other 
words, the imposition of lender liability shifts the supply of funds too far leading to an inefficient result. 






is wi be the case where the dollar amount of the liability is very large and the probability of habthty 1s relatively high. 
1 34. See supra notes 1 1 7-126 and accompanying text. 
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funds, but only at a higher rate of interest. A higher rate of interest 
will, among other things, adversely affect innovation with respect to 
pollution-reducing technology. Enterprises attempting to maximize 
profits have strong incentives to develop cost-reducing production 
techniques. 135  Since CERCLA forces the internalization of the cost of 
pollution, firms will have a greater incentive to develop pollution re­
duction techniques. 1 36 The higher rate of interest makes innovation 
more difficult. Research is not a free activity, and the availability of 
funds is often a key variable influencing the level of research and de­
velopment. 137 Although the results are difficult to quantify, the resul­
tant reduction in innovative activities may render lender liability 
counterproductive i n  the long term. 138 
Finally, the clearest result of holding lenders liable is an increase 
in the number of bankruptcies. 139 While efficiency demands that some 
firms exit the industry, lender liability deters lending institutions from 
taking actions to aid potentially viable enterprises. In fact, banks may 
force borrowers into bankruptcy rather than risk CERCLA liabil­
ity. 140 The actions that lenders typically take to aid a faltering firm 
(e.g., appointing a management consultant or suggesting management 
changes) are precisely those sorts of activities that make CERCLA 
liability more likely. Thus, lenders will be less willing to help, and 
firm failures will increase as a result. 
Imposing CERCLA liability on lenders also severely affects the 
borrower because banks are reluctant to give management assistance 
even to successful firms. The result is that the firms are less efficient, 
even though they remain in business. While some of these effects are 
attributable to the internalization process, many of the impacts go well 
beyond those costs associated with the movement to efficiency. Conse-
135. A cost reducing technique will lower the cost curve and increase the rectangle of profits. Stt 
J. HtRSHLEIFER, supra note 8 1 ,  at 276. 
1 36. This incentive will exist whenever the expected cost of cleanup is greater than the cost of 
pollution prevention. 
1 37. See F.M. SCHERER, supra note 105, at 41 5-4 1 8; J. ScHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SoctALISM 
AND DEMOCRACY 10 I (3d ed. 1 950); and Schwartz & Kamien, Self Financing of an R & D Project, 68 
AM . EcON. REV. 252-61 ( 1 978). 
1 38. It should be noted that there is an effect which may counteract the negative effect on innova· 
tion. The higher interest rates may raise the gains from innovation and create an incentive to undertake 
research activities. The problem with this argument is that direct lender liability increases the interest 
rate beyond the efficient level. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text. Thus. assuming that 
the relevant industry is competitive, the incentive to undertake research is already appropriate, but 
funds must still be available to conduct these activities. 
1 39. See generally Drabkin, Monnan, &. Kirsch, Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous 
Waste: Caveat Creditor, 1 5  Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10168 ( 1 985); Note, Belly Up Down '.n rhe 
Dumps: Bankruptcy and Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1037 (1985); and Baird & 
Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Waste in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 199 (1984). 
140. Soriano & Lockett, supra note 7, at 59. 
682 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
quently, costs are large when compared to the corresponding benefit 
and should be avoided. 14 1  
3. Costs to Third Parties 
All of the costs discussed above will have some impact on third 
parties. For example, an increase in the number of bankruptcies will 
adversely affect other creditors who will receive only a portion of the 
debt owed them. Similarly, consumers will suffer from fewer product 
choices because firms will exit from the industry. 
Perhaps the most significant cost imposed on third parties is that 
lenders will have to pass on their costs associated with potential CER­
CLA liability. If the bank is able to, it will pass on any additional 
costs incurred to consumers of its services, rather than to its share­
holders. 142 The issue is the extent to which costs are passed to compa­
nies other than the polluter. In the absence of price discrimination, 
the lender will have a "pass on" mechanism built in. 143 All customers 
will be forced to pay the higher interest rate, not just those who pol­
lute. Even if the lender is able to engage in price discrimination and 
charge different rates and conditions to different borrowers, limits of 
that process suggest that the cost will be imposed on some innocent 
parties. 144 The lender will limit funds to all potential polluters, which 
means that they will limit funds to some innocent businesses. 14s 
VI. THE PROPOSED STANDARD 
Courts should be reluctant to impose liability on the lender who 
only acts as the supplier of funds. At the same time, a lender who 
engages in a joint venture with a business will directly receive benefits 
from the polluting activity and should not be able to avoid liability 
merely because of its status as a lending institution. Consequently, the 
standard is simply stated. A court should hold a lender liable as an 
141.  These costs take the form of increased firm failures. Since these firms could be successful 
despite internalizing the costs, the failures of the firm are an inefficient cost. The benefit is minimal 
because the costs are already i nternalized to the polluting firm. 
142. The issue is the extent to which costs are passed on to companies other than the polluters. 
The degree of "pass on" will depend upon the elasticity of demand for funds. See generally, J. HIRSH· 
LEIFER, supra note 81, at 1 1 7-23. It would be ideal to have some estimates of elasticities under various 
assumptions, but such an empirical study is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
143. See J. HIRSCHLEIFER, supra note 81,  at 290-96. 
144. Id. 
. 145. It should be noted that a certain degree of the increased cost of funds will be passed on to mn':":ent p�rties even if liability is limited to the polluter. However, the argument here is that the 
add1tt�nal mterest cost associated with lender liability will also be passed on to innocent parties. The result 1s that efficient activities will be deterred. 
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owner under CERCLA only when there is clear evidence of a joint ven­
ture between the polluter and the lender. 
The joint venture is a device utilized by courts to impose certain 
legal consequences due to the nature of the relationship between two 
or more parties. 146 A joint venture has been defined as "an association 
of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise for 
profit, for which purpose they combine their property, money, efforts, 
skill and knowledge. " 147 The existence or nonexistence of a joint ven­
ture is a question o f  fact, but what constitutes a joint venture is a ques­
tion of law. 148 Most authorities agree that four elements must be 
present to find a j oint venture. These elements are: 
"(a) Agreement (express or inferred); 
(b) Joint interest (contribution); 
(c) Sharing profits (and usually losses . . . .  ); 
(d) Mutual right to control."149 
The first element illustrates that the essence of a joint venture is a 
contract and that the intent of the parties is controlling. This intent is 
to be gleaned from the conduct, surrounding circumstances and the 
transactions between the parties. 1 50 The second element requires that 
there be some j oint interest in the money, skill or services contrib­
uted. 1 5 1  The third element requires that "some sharing of profits or 
other gain in the achievement of the venture and some apportionment 
of the risks involved must be found." 152 Although most cases require 
a sharing of a loss, others ignore this requirement. 153 The fourth ele­
ment requires an equal right, express or implied, to exercise some con­
trol over the conduct of each other. 1 54 
The joint venture standard applies to the lender/borrower rela­
tionship. m The case of First National Bank v. Haley, 1 56 illustrates 
this application. In Haley, the First National Bank of Maryland ("the 
Bank") loaned money to the defendant partnership. The loan was evi­
denced by a promissory note. When the defendant failed to pay, the 
Bank sued for default. Applying the elements of a joint venture, the 
146. Taubman, What Constitutes a Joint Venture, 4 1  CORNELL L.Q. 640 ( 1956). 
147. Id. 
148. Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Check, 262 La. 6, 23, 262 So. 2d 3.50, JS7 ( 1972). 
1 49. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 106 (Jd ed. 1983). 
ISO. P & M Cattle Co. v. Holler, 559 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Wyo. 1 977). 
1 5 1 .  Taubman, supra note 146, at 644. 
1 52. George W. Haxton & Son, Inc. v. Rich, 267 App. Div. 492, 49S, 47 N.Y.S.2d SO I .  504 
( 1 944). 
1 53. Usdan v. Rosenblatt, 93 N. Y.S.2d 862, 863 (Sup. Ct. 1 949). 
1 54. Griffin v. Clark. 55 Idaho 364, 375, 42 P.2d 297, 302 ( 1935). 
1 5S. See, e.g. , Guilford Mortgage Co. v. Cunningham Brick Co.,  331 F.2d 343 (4th Cir. 1%4). 
1 56. No. 86 C 29S I (N.D. 111. Dec. I, 1986). 
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defendant argued that the provision in the note that provided that pay­
ments were to fluctuate with the borrower's net income showed that 
the parties intended a joint venture. The defendant further argued 
that the Bank's loan was actually "seed money" and satisfied the con­
tribution requirement. The defendant argued that the Bank main­
tained the requisite control over the joint e nterprise by virtue of 
certain covenants of the borrower in the document. Finally, by basing 
repayment on the borrower's net income, the defendant argued that 
the Bank was sharing in the profits and losses. The court, however, 
was not persuaded. The court indicated that 
[t]here is no control by Bank over the expenditure of the $250,000 
loan. Bank has no control under the Note over the operations of 
the Partnership (the Borrower's covenants are simply the standard 
loan covenants for the maintenance of the integrity of the property 
throughout the loan term). There is no provision explicitly related 
to the sharing of profits and losses, and finally there is no express 
manifestation of the Bank's intent to be associated with the Part­
nership as a joint venture. 1 5 7 
Thus, the court found that the relationship did not constitute a joint 
venture and the Bank was entitled to repayment. 
Haley illustrates that the typical relationship between a borrower 
and a lender will not create a joint venture. More specifically, the fact 
that a lender assists a borrower in obtaining money to pay off his 
loan, 158 approves production plans, 1 59 or inspects the final product 1 60 
will not create a joint venture. Interest is merely the amount paid for 
the use of borrowed money, not a share of the borrower's profits.161 
The application of the joint venture standard to determine 
whether a financial institution is an "owner" under CERCLA is eco­
nomically sound. First, the standard helps solve the uncertainty prob­
lem. Even though the determination of a joint venture is a factual 
determination, the standard is more certain due to the existing body of 
explanatory law. Second, the standard makes it clear that the typical 
clauses in loan agreements (e.g. ,  requiring approval of plans) will not 
subject an institution to CERCLA liability. The same is true of ac­
tions taken to preserve the profitability of the borrower or the value of 
the security interest. Under the joint venture standard, the lender will 
1 57. Id. 
158. George D. Homing, Inc. v. McAleenan, 149 F.2d 561, 566 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 
761 ( 1 945). 
1 59. Gainsville Carpet Mart v. First Fed. Save & Loan Ass'n, 1 2 1 Ga. App. 450, 453, 174 S.E.2d 
230, 233 (1970). 
1 6 0 .  Id 
1 6 1 .  Id at 453-54, 1 74 S.E.2d at 233.  
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face the risk of liability only when it has placed itself in a position to 
directly share in the gain of the enterprise. This is the efficient result 
since the financial entity has essentially become the polluting entity. 
The standard is also consistent with the CERCLA policy of imposing 
l iability on those who benefit. 
Two problems remain notwithstanding the wisdom of the joint 
venture standard. The first of these problems deals with the effect that 
a test that shows hazardous waste will have on lender liability. As 
argued above, the mere fact that a financial institution perf onns tests 
should not create a duty to third persons, even under CERCLA. 162 
However, it can be argued that if a lender chooses to test and that test 
shows the existence of hazardous waste, then the financial entity that 
subsequently loans money is fully aware of the risk and should be re­
garded as an owner under CERCLA. Although this argument is 
somewhat persuasive, it does not lead to the result that a lender should 
be liable every time the tests show a hazardous waste site. Indeed, it 
was argued previously that some businesses will continue to operate in 
spite of the internalization. Furthermore, the restriction of funds lent 
to potential polluters may decrease innovation that would decrease de­
velopment of pollution reduction technology.163 As a result, it is inef­
ficient to impose liability merely because of tests performed by the 
lender. 
Positive test results will still serve an important part in the joint 
venture analysis. Knowledge of the existence of hazardous waste will 
serve as important  evidence in finding the intent to enter into the req­
uisite agreement. However, this knowledge will not be dispositive. 
Rather, the lender's knowledge should be one of the surrounding facts 
and circumstances that the court will examine to find an agreement. 
The second problem that the joint venture does not solve is that 
of the foreclosing lender who then takes the property at a foreclosure 
sale. 164 The joint venture standard would allow a lender to take title 
to the property, hold it while the government pays the cleanup costs, 
and then sell it for an unearned profit. Consequently, the joint venture 
standard must be amended. One commentator suggests that once the 
lender takes the property and the government decides that cleanup is 
necessary, the lender should have a choice of retaining title and paying 
cleanup costs or avoiding liability and abandoning the property. 1 65 
162. See supra notes 1 1 7- 1 25 and accompanying te:u. 
1 63. See supra notes 1 33- 1 38 and accompanying text. 
164. See 1upra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
165.  Soriano & Lockett, supra note 7, at S7-58. 
686 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
This solution avoids the possible windfall, but limits the lender's liabil­
ity to the value of lost profits on the loan. 
It should be noted that potential liability will still enter the 
lender's calculation. However, the lender considers the potential lia­
bility of the borrower only as it affects the value of the security interest 
and the ability of the borrower to repay the loan. As argued previ­
ously, this is the efficient result because it internalizes the external 
costs of pollutio n .  1 66 
This amended joint venture standard isolates the type of activity 
that a lender can take without risking CERCLA liability. Assuming 
that there was n o  joint venture at the time of the loan, the lender may 
take actions to preserve the profitability of the borrower, such as mak­
ing management-type decisions or sending advisors to help the busi­
ness. Furthermore, the lender may take title to the property and 
preserve the value of the security interest in any way the financial in­
stitution sees fit. If that preservation takes the form of continuing op­
erations, those activities will not subject the lender to CERCLA 
liability. Rather, the lender's decision will be to continue the opera­
tion and pay cleanup costs or cease operations altogether and absorb 
the loss on the loan. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The conflict between economic and environmental policy is 
brought into sharp focus by recent decisions that impose liability on a 
lender as an owner or operator under CERCLA. Although it is clear 
that some costs must be imposed in order to accomplish the cleanup, 
imposing liability o n  lenders is too costly in comparison with the bene­
fits received. Specifically, the efficient level of production is reached by 
holding the polluting firm liable, and h olding the lender liable as well 
is both unnecessary and costly. Consequently, the courts should only 
hold the lender liable where it is clear that it has accepted the risk by 
entering into a joint venture with the polluter. In this manner, we can 
reach the efficient level of production a t  minimum cost. 
John M Church 
1 66. See supra notes 1 29- 1 34 and accompanying text. 
